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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a network approach to lobbying. We posit that the building blocks of the
lobbying game are relationships, with lobbyists and legislators benefitting from bonds based on
familiarity and mutual interest. Using data on contributions from lobbyists to legislators in the
2006 electoral cycle, we identify key dimensions of this network. We find that legislators are
more likely to receive donations from the same lobbyists if they are from the same party (in the
Senate), state, or committee; if they are both vulnerable in the next election; and the number of
common donors increases the more agreement there is in the voting record of a pair of
legislators.
Prepared for presentation at the 2009 Meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Toronto, Ontario.
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Scholars have long been puzzled by the relationships between lobbyists and legislators.
A recurring goal has been to understand the game of lobbying by explaining why lobbyists
develop relationships with some legislators and not others. While it seems possible that
lobbyists “buy” votes and other policy favors by wooing undecided or indifferent legislators,
others contend that they purvey information and persuade members of Congress (see for example
Caldeira and Wright 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hansen 1991; Kingdon 1989; Milbrath
1963; Wawro 2001). However, several scholars find that lobbyists tend to concentrate their
attention on political allies, avoid their ideological adversaries, and infrequently lobby fencesitters, suggesting that they are not buying votes or persuading legislators on a case-by-case basis
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Schlozman and Tierney
1986). As an explanation for this behavior, Hall and Deardorff posit that lobbyists “subsidize”
the efforts of members with whom they agree (2006). This paper complements Hall and
Deardorff’s model by identifying factors that promote relationships between lobbyists and
legislators.
We posit that relationships are the essence of lobbying and analyze networks of
connections between lobbyists and members of Congress. We consider lobbyists’ donations to
be investments in long-term relationships, and legislators value these investments as a means to
reelection and as a connection with, and potential influence on, other legislators. Specifically,
this paper analyzes the factors that explain why legislators have lobbyist donors in common, i.e.
the number of donation ties between members of Congress. We use data on over 10,000
donations made by more than 1,200 lobbyists to members of the U.S. House and Senate during
the 2006 election cycle. We find that legislators are more likely to receive donations from the
same lobbyists to the extent they vote together, sit on the same committee, share a party label,
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represent the same state, or are in close races for reelection. These results shed light on both the
relationships between legislators, and on the relationships between lobbyists and legislators. The
next section frames this study, followed by a description of our data, results, and discussion.
II. Lobbyists, Legislators, and Money
Although the 1st Amendment guarantees the right to petition, professional lobbyists have
long been a source of curiosity and concern. In the extreme, lobbyists and organized interests
may induce legislators to prioritize the claims of friendly and generous lobbyists over the
interests of their constituents. Mansbridge (2003), for example, suggests that some interests may
receive “surrogate representation” from representatives without a special constituency stake in
the group’s interest, particularly if the group is able to offer campaign contributions.
There are several explanations for why lobbyists and political action committees donate
to members of Congress, and much research on the effects of campaign contributions from
organized interests. One perspective is that lobbyists’ contributions are a means of purchasing
some good (votes, speeches, etc.) from members of Congress (MCs). Early studies suggesting
that donations influences voting patterns (Saltzman 1987; Wilhite and Theilmann 1987; Wilhite
and Paul 1989) have been questioned by subsequent research (Wawro 2000). A critical question
is how lobbyists could make and enforce contracts to “purchase” specific legislative acts, since
any explicit contract would be illegal and MCs might renege on commitments if contributions
are made before a key vote (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996). To avoid this, organized interests
might make their donations nearly simultaneous to key choices (Stratmann 1998).
A similar view is that lobbyists pay for access, not actions (Chin et al, 2000; Hall and
Wayman 1990; Langbein 1986; Wright 1989). Legislators’ time is scarce and campaign
contributions help to make it “worth their while” to meet with lobbyists. This explanation is
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consistent with the notion that lobbyists seek to inform or persuade MCs (see Austen-Smith 1996
for a review) to the extent that the information they provide lacks enough intrinsic value to merit
access to MCs and their staff.1
A puzzle for either view of lobbying and donations is that legislators tend to lobby, and
donate to, legislators who are their ideological allies while avoiding enemies and undecided MCs
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991; Hansen 1991; Hojnacki and
Kimball 1998, 1999; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). This is consistent with the claim that
lobbyists subsidize the legislative efforts of MCs with whom they agree (Hall and Deardorff
2006). Lobbyists’ donations can be understood as investments in long term relationships
(Snyder 1990, 1992). Lobbyists will tend to value relationships with MCs with whom they agree
on policy, and make contributions as signals of policy agreement (Hall 2009). And, it would be
logical for lobbyists to invest their donations and resources in legislators who are effective and
powerful legislators (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Esterling 2007; Kroszner and
Stratmann 2005).
We see two opportunities to contribute to this literature in this paper. First, all previous
studies of campaign contributions and lobbying strategies have analyzed donations by political
action committees. It seems likely that donations made by organizations aligned with specific
interests are distinct from those made by individual lobbyists—many of whom represent multiple
interests at a time—in the context of a long-term personal relationship. We can deepen our
understanding of the ties between lobbyists and legislators by analyzing the choices lobbyists
make with their own money.

1

This is a possible solution to the puzzle of why MCs grant meetings with nonprofit groups and think tanks without
requiring a donation (Berry 1999): these organizations may provide information with high intrinsic value.
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Second, we hope to gain additional insight by studying lobbying as a social network. The
focus of extant research has been on the interaction between single lobbyists and individual
MCs. This approach focuses attention on the attributes of each lobbyist and MC in a dyad, and
we can learn a lot from this approach. However, we expect to gain extra leverage on the
lobbying game by studying the universe of lobbyists and legislators as a social network. The
unit of analysis in a social network is a relationship between actors, and we can study aggregate
properties of the network (how dense is it? What is the distribution of ties?) and the position of
individual actors within the network. Political scientists have used the methods of social
network analysis to study the interactions between interest groups (Heaney and Rojas 2007);
media, politicians, party organizations, and interest groups in extended party networks (Koger,
Masket, Noel 2009).
Our network approach helps us understand how the interaction between a lobbyist and
legislator can have broader implications. For example, if two MCs work with a similar set of
lobbyists, that might increase the ties between the MCs. Or, as a lobbyist gains in prominence,
his or her legislative allies may benefit as well. The next section explains how this approach can
add to our understanding of lobbying and legislating.
III. The Beltway Network
Lobbyists. We assume that lobbyists and MCs are goal-oriented actors embedded within
an interdependent network. For the sake of clarity, we assume that lobbyists seek to maximize
their income, which is tied to value of their lobbying contracts. Contracts, in turn, are a function
of a lobbyist’s capacity to influence policy outcomes on behalf of clients with specific interests
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(holding price constant). Lobbyists, of course, do not make policy directly; they must work with
legislators to influence the Congressional agenda and the content of legislation.2
All else equal, every lobbyist would like to be able to influence policy made by every
legislator, and each legislator would like to be allied with every lobbyist. In practice, interaction
between lobbyists and legislators is constrained by limitations on campaign contributions and
guided by the structure of the U.S. House and Senate. Both chambers impose strict restrictions
on gifts from lobbyists, and federal campaign law imposes a dual cap on campaign donations:
there is a limit ($2,400 per election in the 2010 cycle) on donations from an individual to a given
candidate, and an overall cap ($115,500 in 2010) on campaign donations to candidates, parties,
and PACs by any individual. This means that each lobbyist’s budget for campaign contributions
is constrained by his or her income and contribution limits, so lobbyists must set priorities as
they develop ties with legislators.
If there was only one lobbyist in Washington D.C., she would undoubtedly devote her
contribution budget to building relationships with the most powerful party and committee leaders
in Congress. However, there are thousands of registered lobbyists, and they cannot all be close
friends of Congress’s busiest members. Consequently, lobbyists have an incentive to specialize
by finding a market niche that matches their backgrounds and talents, and developing
relationships with MCs to fit that niche.
Legislators. Legislators, in turn, desire to influence public policy and to advance their
career goals, including extending their career, advancing within the legislative chamber, and
running for more prestigious offices (Fenno 1973). Lobbyists can help them with each of these
goals. Obviously, lobbyists can promote a MC’s reelection by making a campaign contribution,

2

Obviously, lobbyists also with the White House, executive agencies, and courts to influence policy. Our empirical
focus is on the Congress, however.
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holding a fundraiser, or volunteering for a campaign (e.g. as a D.C.-based fundraiser). Lobbyists
can promote a MC’s policy goals by recruiting him or her as the sponsor of a bill, and by
lobbying other members on behalf of a MC’s legislative initiative. Third, lobbyists can aid a
MC’s effort to win a party leadership post or committee chair by donating to a leadership PAC or
lobbying other members on his or her behalf. MCs thus have an interest in developing alliances
with lobbyists.
Every legislator receives office space and staff, and has the right to speak on the floor,
introduce bills, and cosponsor legislation. Senators also have the privilege of placing a “hold”
on legislation and nominations to keep them from the floor for a period of time (Koger
forthcoming). However, some legislators are better entrepreneurs than others—they are more
interested in making policy, more nuanced in their study of issues, and better able to build
coalitions for proposals. Furthermore, legislators are distinguished by the committee structure of
each chamber, which assign responsibility over a portfolio of policy issues to subsets of
legislators.3 The committee system generates some degree of specialization in both chambers,
but its effect is muted in the Senate by the breadth of senators’ committee portfolios and its
decentralized floor procedures. Finally, legislators are differentiated by their party affiliation,
and by the states which they represent (Matthews and Stimson 1975).
While our data below are not longitudinal, we would expect that lobbyists and legislators
seek to develop long-term relationships. Trust is necessary for a strong relationship because of
the politically delicate nature of their collaborations, including implicit contracts and pragmatic
political calculations; both parties need to know that the other side will be discreet and follow

3

Of course, committee jurisdictions are endogenous (King 1997), possibly overlapping, and can be overridden by a
variety of tactics in each chamber.
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through on commitments. This is especially the case when there are lags between contributions
and rewards, or between legislative actions and additional contributions.
Hypotheses. We test this framework by analyzing on the number of lobbyists who
donate to both MCs in a dyad. That is, for any two members, how many lobbyists-donors do
they have in common? This is a conventional measure of the connections between actors in
social network analysis. In this study, it provides insight on the dimensions that make some
legislators especially worthwhile investments to a subset of lobbyists who share their interests or
value the traits that they have in common.


Hypothesis 1: The more shared committee assignments two legislators have, the more
connected they will be via lobbyists.

Lobbyists may develop special expertise and personal connections to lobby a specific committee,
so MCs on the same committee are likely to work with a similar set of lobbyists.


Hypothesis 2: Legislators from the same party will be more closely connected via lobbyists.

Koger and Victor (2009) find that most lobbyists are highly partisan in their personal campaign
donations—they give almost all their money to Democrats, or all their money to Republicans,
with few lobbyists allocating equal portions of their budget to legislators of both parties.
Similarly, we predict that legislators from the same party are more likely to have common donors
than cross-party dyads.


Hypothesis 3: Legislators from the same state will be more closely connected via lobbyists.

Classic studies of roll call voting (Kingdon 1989; Matthews and Stimson 1975) find that
legislators tend to consult with other legislators from their states, and then are likely to vote with
other members of their state delegation. Members of the same state may share common
economic and political interests (e.g. in promoting an industry that is important to the state
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economy, or protecting a major military base) and, over time, states may develop distinct
political cultures. We expect that there may be subsets of lobbyists who specialize in the issues
particular to a given state and networking with legislators from that state.4


Hypothesis 4: Electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to be connected via
lobbyists than those who are not electorally vulnerable.

Throughout an election cycle, legislators and their party leaders carefully monitor their reelection
prospects, identify the most vulnerable incumbents, and funnel additional contributions to their
campaigns. Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz (2008) demonstrate that there are “national”
donors who give to candidates in competitive races across the country, and some of these donors
reside in the Washington, D.C. area. Thus we expect to observe that vulnerable legislators will
receive more lobbyists’ donations in general, which increases the likelihood that they will share
donors with other legislators.


Hypothesis 5: The more frequently two legislator vote the same way, the more likely they
are to be connected via the same lobbyists.

This is a simple test for preferences; holding party, state, and committee constant, legislators
who share similar views may tend to have similar donors. We are deliberately ambiguous about
the direction of causality in this case; lobbyists may focus on subsets of legislators who hold
similar views independent of any lobbying efforts, or legislators who are tied to the same
lobbyists may be influenced by these lobbyists’ efforts.
IV. Research Design
To test the proposition that lobbyists are primarily motivated by their desire to create and
expand their working networks, and that legislators respond in kind, we have collected data on
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For example, lobbyists often participate in state “societies” that host social events for legislators and staff that
represent a given state.
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lobbyists’ individual campaign donations during the 2006 election cycle.5 Network data is
particularly sensitive to missing observations and sampling error. We therefore seek to test our
hypotheses with a complete population of network data. Our data allow us to identify the
network of lobbyist donors between members of Congress. We identified 20,639 donations by
1,225 lobbyists from January 2005 to December 2006. These include donations to members of
Congress, challengers and candidates for open seats, political action committees, and national
and state party committees. Donations from lobbyists’ spouses are matched to the lobbyist.
From this master list of lobbyist donations in the 2006 cycle we reduced the dataset to include
only aggregated lobbyist donations to incumbent members of Congress, their leadership PACs,
and the national party campaign committees. This results in 10,362 observations of lobbyist
donations to members of Congress or the national party committees.
We created a 508x508 matrix of all the members of congress and national party
committees in the data and calculated the number of common lobbyists between each dyadic pair
of legislators. Table 1 provides some summary statistics on these data. Here you can observe
the great variance that exists in these data. A given member of congress may receive donations
from as few as 1 or as many as 220 individual lobbyists (Senator Clinton was the recipient of the
highest number of donations). The number of donations in common for any dyad of legislators
also ranges from 0 to 101. Of the 128,778 dyads, there are 85,156 dyads with no common
lobbyists. The pair with the most common lobbyist donors (101) is Senator Clinton and the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. Table 2 shows the top 10 dyads with the most
common lobbyist-donors.
[Table 1 goes about here]
[Table 2 goes about here]
5

Data were acquired from the Center for Responsive Politics.
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In our analysis, we conceptualize legislators as existing in a network. To use the parlance
of social network analysis, the “nodes” of this network are individual legislators, and the
“edges,” or connections between the nodes, are the number of common lobbyist donors to any
two members of congress. A cursory look at this network reveals a somewhat meaningless
tangle of so many nodes and edges that one can barely discern the difference between the two.
In order to provide more context to these network graphs, we have developed a series of
hypothetical graphs that provide a point of reference for visual examination. We can use these
graphs to help determine if expected relationships exist in the data. Figures 1 and 2 respectively
present the lobbyist-donor network for the House and Senate. Blue nodes represent Democrats
and red nodes represent Republicans. In each Figure, the graph on the left represent hypothetical
data, where the edges are the average number of common lobbyists between legislators, while
the graph on the right represents the actual data. In Figures 1 and 2 there are so many nodes and
edges that it is difficult to infer any meaning, but these graphs at least provide a visual
benchmark of the data.
[Figure 1 goes about here]
[Figure 2 goes about here]
We engage in two stages of analysis to test our hypotheses. First, we run a series of
bivariate t-tests and visually examine partitions of the network to determine if the relationships
we expect to find in the data are indeed present. Next, we use a more traditional regression
approach to model the entire structure of the data and ascertain if, controlling for a set of usual
covariates, we find expected relationships in the data.
The bivariate test of our first hypothesis requires that we examine the number common
lobbyist-donors between legislators who share committee assignments and those who do not. In
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the House, where committees are larger and each legislator sits on up to three committees,
legislators may share zero, or up to three common committee assignments. The mean number of
shared committees between dyads is 0.226. In the Senate, where members tend to sit on more
committees than House members do, the range of shared committee assignment is 0 to 4 and the
mean is 0.719. Table 3 provides a tabulation of shared committee assignments for each chamber.
To test the hypothesis that members who share committee assignments will be more likely to
have common lobbyist donors we examine the number of common lobbyist for dyads that share
zero committees and those that have at least one committee assignment in common. The results
for all t-tests for all four hypotheses are presented in Table 4. The hypothesis that House
members who share committee assignment are likely to have common lobbyist-donors is
supported. House members who share at least one committee assignment have 1.2 common
lobbyists on average while those with no common committee assignments have 0.46 common
donors. In the Senate, while we have the same expectation as we do for the House, we do not
find the same result. Senators with no common committee assignments have more common
lobbyists (3.7) than senators with at least one common committee (0.8). This is a somewhat
surprising result that suggests the network of common lobbyists in the House operates
differently, or reveals something different, than it does in the Senate. We will investigate this
finding further in the multivariable analysis in the next section.
[Table 3 goes about here]
[Table 4 goes about here]
Our second hypothesis seeks to test the idea that legislators of the same party will be
more likely to share common lobbyist donors than those of opposite parties. While 50% of the
dyads are from the same party, recall that these data are from the 109th Congress where the
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Republicans held a majority in both chambers. At that time, Republicans held 221 seats in the
House to Democrats’ 183. Also, Republicans held 54 seats in the Senate to Democrats’ 40. A
simple test of this idea is to look at a t-test of same party dyads versus opposite party dyads for
the entire network. If we examine the entire network we find that same-party dyads have an
average of 1.33 common lobbyist donors while opposite party dyads have 0.35 common lobbyist
donors (t = -76.97). Table 4 shows the results broken down for the House and Senate. In the
House, same party dyads have 0.84 lobbyist donors in common, while opposite party dyads have
0.22 common lobbyist donors. In the Senate the difference is even more pronounced; same party
dyads have 6.1 lobbyist donors in common, while opposite party dyads have 1.5 lobbyist donors
in common. This provides cursory support for hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 states that legislators from the same state should share more lobbyist donors
than those from different states. Here we examine the entire network and find that legislators
from the same state have an average of 1.4 lobbyist donors while those from different states have
0.82 common lobbyist donors. Overall, in the data 3.4% of dyads are from the same state. Even
with this relatively small percent of same-state dyads, we still find that those from the same state
share more lobbyist donors. This supports our expectations.
Hypothesis 4 states that legislators who are electorally vulnerable should have more
common lobbyist donors than those who are electorally safe. In the Senate, we only examine
senators who were up for reelection in 2006. By this standard, in dyads where both senators are
in cycle they share, on average, 13.2 lobbyist donors. If at least one member of the dyad is not in
cycle, they will share an average of 0.8 lobbyist donors. In the House, we consider a legislator to
be electorally vulnerable if Charlie Cook identified the district as “competitive.” By this
standard, if both members of the House dyad are vulnerable, they will tend to share 1.37 lobbyist

13

donors; whereas, if at least one member of the dyad is not vulnerable they will share 0.8 lobbyist
donors. This hypothesis lends itself to a visual examination better than the others because we are
examining a relatively small number of nodes. Figure 3 shows the 34 legislators in competitive
districts. The graph on the left shows edges with a hypothetical, or average, tie strength between
nodes, and the graph on the right shows the actual tie strength between these 30 most electorally
vulnerable legislators. The opacity of edges indicates the strength of the tie. The right graph
displays darker connections between nodes than the left graph. Figure 4 displays the same data
for the 29 senators who are in cycle. The left graph, that displays edges with an average number
of lobbyist donors, shows connections that are lighter in color than the graph on the right. The
right graph shows dark connections between senators in cycle, indicating that they tend to share
many common lobbyist donors.
Multivariate Analysis
While our initial inspection of the data suggests that our predictions are plausible, we
seek to engage in a careful multivariate analysis that will allow for a simultaneous test of our
hypotheses. In choosing a model to fit to our data we want to be particularly sensitive to the
fundamental problem of social network data—autocorrelation. This problem arises whenever
dyads are the unit of observation, but is further complicated with network data. In a standard
regression we assume that observations are independent, but when the unit of analysis is a dyad,
observations on a pair of actors in a network are highly dependent. Clearly, Rep. Hoyer, for
example, is member of many dyads in the data and these observations cannot be considered
independent, for they contain the same actor. There has been great progress in recent years in
developing models to address this problem. The best approach for continuous variables has been
in the use of mixed models, or hierarchical models. In these models, one can use a random
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effects estimator to capture much of the network-based autocorrelation. We describe our
application of this approach below. In addition, our dependent variable is a count variable and in
order to make accurate inferences with our coefficients, we require a model that accurately
captures the distribution of the data, since they are clearly not normally distributed. In our case,
the dependent variable is a count of the number of common lobbyist donors between any two
legislators.
To develop a model that appropriately accounts for the count-nature of the dependent
variable and the dependence and unobserved heterogeneity associated with our dyadic social
network data, we employ a poisson model with a legislator-specific random intercept ζ1j (see
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). In a typical hierarchical model one conceives of occasions,
(i), as a level-1 component, and subjects (j), as a level-2 component. Instead, we conceive of the
first level “clusters” as legislator-legislator dyads (i), and the unit embedded within the clusters
as being individual legislators (j). In our data, each dyad has two legislators (i, j). Our data
therefore has just two “clusters” since each dyad includes two legislators. However, each
legislator is a part of N-1 dyads, where N is the number of legislators. We are not so concerned
with modeling legislators as clusters, as is common with a random effect approach; rather, we
use the random effect estimator to account for the unobserved heterogeneity between
observations and allow us to make appropriate inferences on coefficients.
Our count data has the added complication of being overdispersed (the variance is greater
than the mean). We therefore wish to model this overdispersion, which is typically done through
a negative binomial model. However, the random-intercept model with a normally distributed
random intercept does not have a closed-form likelihood. To solve this problem we take the
approach described by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 390-1) and induce a closed-form
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likelihood by specifying a gamma distribution for the exponentiated random intercept. The
model we estimate therefore looks like the following:
|

where

|

~Γ 1,

,

1. In this way, we include a level-2

, so that α corresponds to

random intercept (ζ1j) that will account for the dependence between observations, and we employ
a distributionally appropriate model that accounts for the overdispersion in our count data.
We estimate the House model separately from the Senate model. There are 407 House
legislators and 95 individual senators in our data. In the House data there are 85,078 dyads and
the Senate data has 4,465 dyads. In the hierarchical setup each dyad is represented twice in the
analysis so that the unit of analysis is the individual legislator. This makes the total (possible) N
for each model 170,156 and 8,930, respectively.6
To test hypothesis 5, which states that we expect legislators who vote together more often
to have more common lobbyist donors, we require a measure of voting coincidence. We develop
this measure by gathering data on every vote that every legislator took in the 109th Congress.
For each dyad, we calculated the percentage of votes on which both legislators in each dyad
voted together, given that they both voted. In the House this voting coincidence score ranges
from 0.157 to 1, with a mean of 0.69. In the Senate this voting coincidence score ranges from
0.29 to 0.97, with a mean of 0.649.

6

Some missing cases in the House data brings our N to 161,986.
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Additionally, we include a covariate for the total number of lobbyists that lobbied a dyad
in order to control for the total number of donors to any pair of legislators. This control variable
helps to render observations comparable, given that some legislator may have many more
lobbyist donors than others.
V. Results
The results of our House and Senate mixed models are presented in Table 5. Both
models (House and Senate) produce robust results with coefficients in the expected directions.
We have presented the incident rate ratios (IRR) as opposed to beta coefficients, for ease of
substantive interpretation. We find that in both chambers the more members vote alike, the more
common lobbyist donors they share. In the House, a one unit increase in the rate with which two
legislators vote the same corresponds to sharing 22 lobbyist-donors, all else being equal. In the
Senate the effect is not quite as strong. In the Senate, a one unit increase in the rate with which
two senators vote the same corresponds to sharing 6 common lobbyist donors, all else being
equal.
In both the House and Senate models we find that overlapping committee service is
positive and statistically significant (hypothesis 1). This supports our expectations. Legislators
who serve on committees together are more likely to share lobbyist donors than those who do not
serve on committees together. In each chamber, a one unit increase in the coincidence of
committee service leads to sharing an additional lobbyist-donor. This is indicative of the
overlapping policy interests of these legislators, which lobbyists also recognize and seek to
support.
Regarding hypothesis 2, being in the same party, we find support in the Senate model but
not in the House model for our expectations. In the House the coefficient is not statistically
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significantly different from zero. This is a somewhat surprising result in the rule-laden House
that has such strong party loyalty. This result merits further investigation. In the Senate, we find
that senators from the same party are likely to have 2 more common lobbyist donors than those
who are not from the same party.
Regarding hypothesis 3, we find support in the House model for our expectations, but not
in the Senate model. The coefficients for same state in both models are positive, but only in the
House model is the standard error of the estimate sufficient small to confidently distinguish the
estimate from zero. This shows that House members from the same state are likely to share
lobbyist donors (2.2 donors), but that Senators from the same state are no more likely to share
lobbyist donors than those from different states.
Finally, in both chambers we find that legislators who are electorally vulnerable are more
likely to share lobbyist donors than those who are not at risk. In the House the 34 legislators
who sit in competitive seats are more likely to share lobbyist donors than those from safe seats.
In the Senate, being in cycle renders one more likely to share lobbyist donors than being out of
cycle. In both chambers, being electorally vulnerable leads to a dyad sharing an additional
lobbyist-donor. These findings support our expectations.
VI. Conclusion
We set out to understand the relationships between lobbyists and legislators, particularly
the dimensions along which actors in the “Beltway Network” cluster and divide. We have found
that lobbyists make campaign donations to members of Congress in a systematic manner that
reveals information about the common interests of legislators. Legislators who vote the same
way, share committee assignments, and who are electorally vulnerable will share more individual
lobbyist campaign donors than legislators who do not have these characteristics. In the House,
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we also find that being from the same state makes legislators more likely to share lobbyistdonors, while in the Senate being from the same party has that effect.
By using common lobbyist donors as a way to link legislators, we find many expected
patterns regarding policy areas (committees), party, geography, voting and electoral
vulnerability. These expected patterns show that lobbyists make relationships (as revealed
through their campaign donation behavior) with likeminded legislators, suggesting both a
bifurcation of the lobbying community and a tendency of homophily between legislators and
lobbyists.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Donations to Members of Congress

# of donors per MC
Proportion of all donors
who gave to an MC
# of donors per Dyad of
MCs

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

Max

22

13

27

1

220

9%

5%

11%

.5%

100%

.8

0

2.3

0

101

22

Table 2 Top Incumbent Recipients, by Number of Common Lobbyist Donors

Member 1

Member 2

DSCC

Clinton

DSCC
Cantwell
DCCC
Santorum
DCCC
Conrad
Carper
DSCC

Cantwell
Clinton
DSCC
Allen
Clinton
Cantwell
Cantwell
Conrad

Number of
Common Lobbyist
Donors
101
83
76
68
67
65
61
60
60
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Table 3 Number of Shared Committees for each Dyad
Number of
Shared

House

House

Senate

Senate

Committees

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

0

128,086

79.06

4,028

45.11

1

31,270

19.30

3,570

39.98

2

2,594

1.6

1,154

12.92

3

56

0.03

168

1.88

4

-

-

10

0.11

162,006

100.0

8,930

100.0

per Dyad

Total
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Table 4: T‐Tests for Hypotheses 1‐4

Hypothesis Description
1
Legislators that share the same committee
assignments will share more lobbyist
donors
1

2
2
3
4

4

Variable
HOUSE: Dyad shares no common
committee assignments
HOUSE: Dyad shares at least one
common committee assignment

Mean #
of
Common
Lobbyist
Donors
0.46

SENATE: Dyad shares no common
committee assignments

3.70

SENATE: Dyad shares at least one
common committee assignment

0.80

Legislators of the same party will share
lobbyist donors.
Legislators of the same party will share
lobbyist donors.
Legislators from the same state will share
more lobbyist donors.
Senators in cycle in 2006 will share more
common lobbyist donors than those not in
cycle.

HOUSE: Same party dyads
HOUSE: Opposite party dyads
SENATE: Same party dyads
SENATE: Opposite party dyads
Legislators from same state
Legislators from different states
Both Senators in Cycle

0.84
0.22
6.10
1.50
1.4
0.82
13.20

Neither or one Senator in cycle

0.80

25

Pr(T)
0.000

Result
supported

55.66

0.000

unsupported

‐68.7

0.000

supported

‐24.2

0.000

supported

‐15.7

0.000

supported

‐110

0.000

supported

‐5.3

0.000

supported

1.20

Legislators that share the same committee
assignments will share more lobbyist
donors

House members in competative seats will
Both legislators are in competitive
share more lobbyist donors than those not districts
in competative seats.
Neither or one legislator in a
competitive district

T
‐58.45

1.37
0.838

Table 5
Random Intercept Poisson Model, 2006 election cycle

FIXED EFFECTS
Voting Coincidence
Committee Service
Coincidence
Dyad in Same Party
Dyad in Same State
At least one member of
Dyad Electorally Vulnerable
Number of Common Donors
alpha
N
Number of Groups
Wald Chi‐squared (6)
Prof > F
Log Restricted‐Likelihood

House

Senate

Common Lobbyist
Donors

Common Lobbyist
Donors

IRR
22.259280
(2.85776)

1.311490
(0.023387)

1.075230
(0.0558802)

2.284830
(0.0856034)

1.466812
(0.0309803)

1.009795
(0.0002013)

Pr>|z|
0.000
0.000
0.163
0.000
0.000
0.000

IRR
6.358215
(1.3338)

1.053011
(0.0269)

2.172521
(0.18936)

1.095768
(0.2065)

3.842020
(0.15299)

1.001071
(0.00016 )

3.829929

1.379640

(0.0444605)

(0.03966)

161986
80993
9403.75
0
‐110344.31

8930
4465
2637.19
0
‐15589.7
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Pr>|z|
0.000
0.043
0.000
0.627
0.000
0.000

Figure 1 The House Lobbyist-Donor Network

Hypothetical Data: Average number of donors

Actual Data: The opacity of an edge indicates

between legislators.

the number of common lobbyist-donors.
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Figure 2 The Senate Lobbyist-Donor Network

Hypothetical Data: Average number of donors

Actual Data: The opacity of an edge indicates

between legislators.

the number of common lobbyist-donors.
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Figure 3 House Members in Competitive Seats

Hypothetical Data: Average number of donors between

Actual Data: Opacity of edges indicates the number of

legislators

common lobbyist donors.
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Figure 4 Senators in Cycle

Hypothetical Data: Average number of

Actual Data: Opacity of edges indicates

donors between legislators

the number of common lobbyist donors.
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